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I 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20030695-CA 
JASON NOALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a jury's finding of guilty in the Second Judicial 
District Court on the 7th day of May, 2003, and the Court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment on July 1, 2003, and sentencing on 
July 15, 2003. The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on July 
21,2003. A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 20, 2003. The Defendant 
was convicted of theft, a second-degree felony. Jurisdiction for the appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT 
WHEN HE REFERRED TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY 
WASN'T JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING 
THEIR VERDICT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of 
the totality of the evidence presented at trial. See, State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 
925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue should be reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. "The trial court's rulings on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
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UTAH CODE 
U.C.A. §76-6-404 Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with theft, a second-degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404. (R.001). Following a preliminary 
hearing, the Defendant pled not guilty and the case was set for a jury trial. (R. 
015). Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that they be 
allowed to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 020-27). A hearing was held on this 
motion on May 1, 2003. The trial court denied the State's motion in limine. A 
jury trial was held on May 7, 2003, in front of the Honorable Pamela G. 
Heffernan. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. (R. 040). 
On June 10, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment. (R. 094-
95). A hearing on said motion was held on July 1, 2003. The Defendant's 
motion was denied. A written findings of fact, conclusions of law and order 
was submitted and signed on July 15, 2003. (R. 121-24). The Defendant was 
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sentenced on July 15, 2003. He was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years 
at the Utah State Prison. The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed 
on July 21, 2003. (R. 125-26). The Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 
August 20, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 17, 2002, three individuals went into J.W. Auto Sales in 
Ogden, Utah. One of these individuals talked with a salesman, Thomas Salazar, 
("Salazar") and indicated that he was interested in a sports utility vehicle 
(SUV). (R. 146/52-54). Salazar showed the individual a SUV and told him the 
price. The price was apparently too high so Salazar showed him an older 
Chevrolet Blazer that was a lot less money. Salazar allowed the individual to 
take this cheaper Blazer for a test drive. He did not obtain identification from 
the person who took the Blazer for the test drive. (R. 146/57). 
The vehicle wasn't returned to the lot so Salazar called the police. (R. 
146/59). Salazar gave the police a description of the individual who drove off 
in the vehicle. He was approximately six feet tall, and weighed between one 
hundred and ninety and two hundred pounds. He had a goatee and his hair was 
cut shorter on the bottom. (R. 146/60). At a later date, Detective Jeff Pickrell 
of the Ogden Police Department showed Salazar a photo line-up. The 
Defendant's picture was included in that line-up. Salazar picked the 
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Defendant's picture and identified him as the individual who took the Blazer 
for a test drive. (R. 146/61). Salazar testified at the Defendant's preliminary 
hearing on November 12, 2002, and identified him as the individual who test-
drove the vehicle. (R. 146/62). At the trial, Salazar testified that the Defendant 
had a little grin or smirk that he had noticed when he interacted with him at the 
car lot and that he noticed it again at the pre-trial. (R. 146/62-63). 
Detective Jeff Pickrell ("Pickrell") of the Ogden Police Department 
received information from a gang detective that a confidential informant gave 
him some information concerning the Defendant. (R. 146/77-78). Defendant's 
trial counsel objected to the statement coming in for the truth of the matter 
asserted. The trial court instructed the jury that this information was coming in 
for the limited purpose of explaining why the officer did what he did. (R. 
146/78). 
The prosecutor didn't ask Pickrell what information he had. Instead he 
asked him, "From the information you got through the officer from the 
confidential informant, what did you do with the information that the defendant 
might be a suspect?" Id. Pickrell put together a photo line-up and took it to 
Mr. Salazar to see if he could identify the Defendant. He included a picture of 
the Defendant and five other similar appearing men. (R. 146/78-80). Salazar 
picked the Defendant's picture out of this line up. (R. 146/83). The vehicle 
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was recovered on October 2, 2002. At the time it was recovered it was being 
driven by someone other than the Defendant. (R. 146/84). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated when 
the prosecutor referred to matters during his closing argument that the jury 
wasn't justified in considering when determining their verdict. There had been 
hearsay testimony admitted during the trial. This hearsay evidence allegedly 
came to a gang detective through a confidential informant and indicated that 
the Defendant was involved in the vehicle theft. This evidence was admitted 
for the limited purpose of explaining why the detective took a photo line-up 
with the Defendant's picture in it to the salesman at the car lot. The jury was 
instructed that they could consider it for that limited purpose only. 
Defendant's trial counsel argued in his closing argument that it was 
possible that Defendant returned the vehicle and a third party stole it. The 
prosecutor in his rebuttal pointed out that Pickrell didn't just pull the 
Defendant's name out of a hat, but that he had a reason to put the Defendant's 
picture in that photo line-up. 
By arguing this evidence to the jury, the prosecutor caused the jury to 
consider facts which they were not justified in considering in determining their 
verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT 
WHEN HE REFERRED TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY 
WASN'T JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING 
THEIR VERDICT. 
A prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and require a reversal if: 
"(1) the questions or remarks called to the jury's attention matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict, and (2) under the 
circumstances, the jury was probably influenced by the remarks." State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
To understand why the prosecutor's comments during his closing 
argument constitute misconduct a review of the evidence is in order. Mr. 
Salazar, the salesman at J.W. Auto Sales testified that the Defendant took a 
SUV for a test drive. The prosecutor asked him when he became concerned 
that the vehicle might not be coming back. (R. 146/58). Salazar answered that 
when they (Defendant) left there was a white car parked on the curb. 
Approximately forty-five minutes later, Salazar noticed that this white car was 
gone. Id. He assumed that the white car was the Defendant's, although he 
didn't see him or his friends get out of it. (R. 146/59). The vehicle the 
Defendant test drove was not returned and Salazar notified the police. (R. 
146/60). 
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This vehicle was recovered approximately two weeks later. It was being 
driven by someone other than the Defendant. (R. 146/84). Detective Pickrell 
testified that "[o]ne of the gang detectives came to me, and a confidential 
informant had told him that --" (R. 146/77). Defendant's trial attorney 
interrupted and objected to this information coming in for the truth of the 
matter asserted. Id. The prosecutor answered, "we have no objection to that, 
your honor. We're offering it just to show why he put together the lineup, not 
for the truth of the matter." Id. 
The trial court then instructed the jury that this information was to be 
admitted solely for the purpose of showing why the officer acted in the manner 
he did. (R. 146/77-78). The following colloquy took place between the 
prosecutor and Detective Pickrell. 
Prosecutor: Based on that information, what did you do then? 
Pickrell: I - on the information I got from -
Prosecutor: Yes. From the information you got through the officer from 
the confidential informant, what did you do with the 
information that the defendant might be a suspect? 
Pickrell: I composed a photo lineup - (R. 146/78). 
This double hearsay was extremely prejudicial towards the Defendant. 
Especially considering that Detective Pickrell indicated that he received it from 
8 
a gang detective. However, Defendant's trial attorney allowed it to be admitted 
for the limited purpose of explaining why Detective Pickrell took a photo line-
up that included the Defendant's picture to Mr. Salazar. The prosecutor 
himself acknowledged that they were not introducing this evidence for the truth 
of the matter asserted but only to show why Pickrell took the actions that he 
did. 
During closing argument, Defendant's trial attorney argued that; 
"The person who does the talking seems interested in a particular 
SUV, and they start talking price. That person gets hesitant when 
you're talking about the price. I would submit that if the person is 
going to steal a vehicle, he's not going to hesitate about the price 
and say, I want to steal something cheaper. That's not going to be 
going through his mind, the price of this was too much; I'm going 
to steal a cheaper vehicle. So I would submit that is something 
you can take into consideration on whether or not the State has 
proved that the person who took the car for the test-drive was even 
the same person who stole the vehicle.And Mr. Salazar doesn't get 
any identification from this person, goes in and gets the keys, 
gives him the keys, tells him to take it for a drive. No testimony 
as to what the person was supposed to do when he came back, 
whether he was supposed to talk to Mr. Salazar, where he 
supposed to park the car, whatever. . . . He (Salazar) doesn't 
see it leave. That's when he first starts getting concerned, is when 
he sees that white car is gone, cause he assumes that the people 
who took the car for a test drive were riding in that white car. I 
would submit there's a lot of things that happened that Mr. Salazar 
never saw. The person who took the vehicle for a test drive could 
have returned the car, could have left, and someone else could 
have the stolen the car. . . . Like I say, if a person is going to 
commit a theft of a vehicle, why is he going to be quibbling about 
the price and want to steal the cheaper vehicle?" (R. 146/124-25). 
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Defendant's attorney had already pointed out that the State carries the 
burden of proving each element of their case beyond a reasonable doubt. In an 
attempt to establish reasonable doubt, he pointed out some alternative 
possibilities. 
During the prosecutor's rebuttal portion of his closing argument he 
responded by saying, "Again, recall that the detective didn't just pull his name 
out of the hat. Okay. There was some reason to put together a full lineup with 
his picture in there." (R. 146/127). 
Defendant's attorney objected and pointed out that this evidence was 
admitted for a limited purpose, merely to explain what the detective did. The 
prosecutor then argued to the judge that "[h]e (Pickrell) had a reason to put 
together a photo lineup, and he did. He didn't just come up with this name out 
of a hat or because he didn't like Mr. Noall. I think it's relevant for that 
purpose, to show that he had information to put it together - " (R. 146/128). 
The trial judge stated "I think you need - " 
The prosecutor interrupted her and said "—and that's all I'm going [to] 
argue." 
The trial judge then stated, "I think you need to very limit your argument 
to that, though --" (R. 146/128). 
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The trial judge apparently found the reference to this information 
appropriate as she didn't sustain Defendant's objection and she didn't instruct 
the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments. 
Prior to sentencing, Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion to arrest 
judgment. (R. 094-95). One of the issues he raised in this motion was the 
prosecutor's statement during his closing argument. There was a hearing on 
this motion and the trial judge found that there was "no harm in allowing him 
to argue during closing arguments what was already received into evidence for 
that limited purpose." (R. 147/Tab 3/5). The court also signed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law that ruled the "information was admitted for a 
limited purpose and the prosecutor's mention of that limited purpose in his 
closing argument was not misconduct and was harmless." (R. 122). 
Based on the above, the first part of the prosecutorial misconduct test is 
met. "[D]id the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict . . ." State v. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). The prosecutor's remarks referred to the fact 
that Detective Pickrell had information from a gang detective that the 
Defendant had something to do with the theft of the vehicle. 
The jury had been instructed that they were not to consider that 
information for the truth of the matter asserted and that they were only to use 
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that information to understand why the detective put together a photo line-up 
with the Defendant's picture in it. However, on the prosecutor's rebuttal 
portion of his closing argument he argued that that "the detective didn't just 
pull his name out of the hat. Okay. There was some reason to put together a 
full lineup with his picture in there." (R. 146/127) He also stated in front of 
the jury, "[h]e had a reason to put together the photo lineup, and he did. He 
didn't just come up with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like Mr. 
Noall." (R. 146/128). 
There was only one message the jury could receive from this. Someone 
had told a gang detective that the Defendant stole the vehicle. By arguing this 
evidence in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument he improperly argued 
facts that the jury could not consider when arriving at its verdict. 
This information was not only hearsay, but double hearsay. Allowing 
the prosecutor to argue that Detective Pickrell had a reason to put the 
Defendant's picture in the photo line-up violated the Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses. In State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "if the declarant is not 
present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated because the 
essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing 
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witness in court and subject to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility 
can be evaluated by the finder of fact." Id. at 1112. 
In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront 
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a 
two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation. 
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of 
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or 
'devastating' to the defendant." Id. The second part of the test is "[sjecond, 
we look at the availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the 
declarant will add any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of 
fact to observe the demeanor of the witness." Id. 
The evidence that a gang detective told Detective Pickrell that a 
confidential informant gave him information concerning the Defendant and the 
stolen vehicle was "devastating" to the Defendant. The jury did not have the 
benefit of knowing who this "confidential informant" was, what information he 
or she had, how he/she obtained this information, whether there was any bias 
on the part of the informant, or whether or not they had a criminal record. It 
was certainly improper for the jury to be able to consider this information when 
arriving at their verdict. However, this is exactly what the prosecutor 
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encouraged them to do when he pointed out that Pickrell didn't pull the name 
out of a hat and that he had a reason to include the Defendant's picture in that 
photo line-up. 
In deciding whether the second part of the prosecutor misconduct test is 
met an appellate court should consider all of the evidence concerning a 
defendant's guilt. See, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)("Step two 
is more difficult and involves a consideration of the circumstances of the case 
as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is appropriate to look at the 
evidence of defendant's guilt."). "If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a 
case with less compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the 
conduct." Id. (citations omitted). 
The proof in the case at bar was not very strong. Three individuals went 
to a car lot to test drive a Blazer. The Defendant thought the first SUV he was 
shown was too expensive. He then test-drove a cheaper one. Forty-five 
minutes later the salesman noticed that a white car he assumed the Defendant 
arrived in was gone. He then reported the Blazer as stolen. Two weeks later 
someone other than the Defendant was found driving the Blazer. There was no 
evidence that the driver implicated the Defendant in any way. Nor was there 
any physical evidence such as fingerprints that connected the Defendant to the 
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Blazer. The Defendant was convicted based on a photo line-up that was first 
shown to Mr. Salazar and then months later by in court identifications when the 
Defendant was the only person sitting in the Defendant's seat in the courtroom. 
When this case is viewed in its entirety, the information from the gang 
detective is the kind of evidence which "the jury would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict . . ." Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. When 
the minimal evidence concerning the Defendant's guilt is considered, it 
becomes clear that the jurors "were probably influenced by those remarks." Id, 
For these reasons, the prosecutor committed reversible error when his remarks 
called "to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict. . . ." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when the 
prosecutor referred to the hearsay evidence during his closing argument. He 
improperly argued facts that the jury could not consider when determining their 
verdict. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction. 
DATED this 2nd day of February 2004. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid 
this 2nd day of February, 2004. 
DEE W.SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM 
17 
ADDENDUM A 
L. DEAN SAUNDERS, UBN 6324 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON NO ALL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 021904790 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
On May 7, 2003, defendant was convicted by a jury of the offense of Theft of Motor 
Vehicle, a Second Degree Felony. On June 10, 2003, defendant filed a Motion to Arrest 
Judgment under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court, having received 
the briefs of counsel and heard the arguments of counsel as to Defendant's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. The jury verdict in this case was supported by highly substantial evidence. 
3. The information from a confidential informant, and from the person found in the 
vehicle, that defendant may have been the one who had taken the vehicle was admitted for the 
limited purpose of showing why defendant was added to the photo line-up as a suspect. 
4. The Court appropriately instructed the jury concerning how the jury should view this 
121 
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information about defendant. The prosecutor's mention of that information and its limited 
purpose in closing argument was not misconduct and was harmless. 
5. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the testimony of the eyewitness and 
the circumstances of his contact with defendant, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they 
testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. Defendant has failed to set forth any grounds to support a motion to arrest judgment. 
3. The evidence presented at trial did constitute a public offense. 
4. The verdict of the jury was supported by highly substantial evidence. 
5. The Court appropriately instructed the jury how to view the information about 
defendant being a possible suspect. That information was admitted for a limited purpose and the 
prosecutor's mention of that limited purpose in his closing argument was not misconduct and 
was harmless. 
6. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the testimony of the eyewitness and 
the circumstances of his contact with defendant, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they 
testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Defendant Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2 
122 
ORDER 
Wherefore, Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgement is Denied. 
DATED this [j day of July, 2003 
PAMEEAG. HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
Martin Gravis 
Attorney for Defendant 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
DATED this J_^_ day of July, 2003. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JASON NOALL, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021904790 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: July 15, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: L. DEAN SAUNDERS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 30, 1974 
Video 
Tape Number: H071503 Tape Count: 3 03 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/07/2003 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by 
Martin Gravis. 
Page 1 1 or 
Case No: 021904790 
Date: Jul 15, 2003 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The court orders sentence imposed to run concurrent with sentence 
defendant is currently serving; all to be served at the Utah State 
Prison. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The court recommends defendant receive credit for time served since 
05/07/03. The court also recommends restitution in the amount of 
$2,951.00 be collected as a condition of parole. 
Dated this day of JLf 
1PAMELX G^H^FFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 12G 
ADDENDUM B 
1 A Essentially at first it's — I didn't have any leads 
2 on it. It was — I went down and talked to Mr. Salazar, a PR 
3 thing, to let — let him know we'd put out ATL's. And I sent 
4 out a weekly new bulletin to the surrounding agencies, the cars 
5 that I'm looking for. 
6 Q Did you review the physical description that 
7 Mr. Salazar gave originally? 
8 A I did. 
9 Q What was that, if you recall? 
10 A A white male, I believe in the early twenties, about 
11 six-one, 200 pounds. 
12 Q Okay. Just describe what happened next on the case. 
13 A I got a lead. One of the gang detectives came to me, 
14 and a confidential informant had told him that — 
15 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this 
16 coming in for the truth of the matter asserted. 
17 MR. SAUNDERS: We have no objection to that, your 
18 Honor. We're offering it just to show why he put together the 
19 lineup, not for the truth of the matter. 
20 MR. GRAVIS: I'd like the Court to instruct the jury 
21 what's going on so they understand. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Basically, it's preparatory 
23 information as to the information the officer put together to 
24 display to the witness, and you'll hear more about the details 
25 of what that is. Any preparatory comments as to what - why he 
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1 did what he did are solely admitted for the purpose of showing 
2 why he did what he did, as opposed to any kind of truth of the 
3 matter asserted. Hopefully you understand that instruction, 
4 but that's essentially what it is. It comes in for a limited 
5 purpose only, and when I instructed you originally that some 
6 evidence may come in for a limited purpose only, this is one of 
7 those. It's just coming in solely as a preparatory statement 
8 to indicate why he did what he did. Okay? 
9 Q (BY MR. SAUNDERS) Based on that information, what 
10 did you do then? 
11 A I — on the information I got from — 
12 Q Yes. From the information you got through the 
13 officer from the confidential informant, what did you do with 
14 the information that the defendant might be a suspect? 
15 A I composed a photo lineup — 
16 Q Okay. 
17 A — took it back down to Mr. Salazar. 
18 MR. SAUNDERS: May I approach the witness, your 
19 Honor? 
20 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
21 Q (BY MR. SAUNDERS) Showing you what's been marked as 
22 State's proposed Exhibit No. 1, do you recognize this? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q what is that? 
25 A My photo lineup. 
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1 vehicle, and I would submit they haven't even proved that. 
2 Mr. Salazar testified that when he first observed the 
3 three people, they were over on this northeast side of the car 
4 lot. He hadn't observed them arrive. He didn't know what they 
5 were driving. He assumed they were parked in this white car 
6 down here, that that's what they arrived in, but he never saw 
7 them walk across the car lot. He doesn't know whether they 
8 arrived in the same vehicle. 
9 There's no testimony how they arrived, whether the 
10 three people arrived together or separately, two in one car, 
11 one in another, whatever. He doesn't see them until they're 
12 already on the parking lot. He assumes later on that they 
13 arrived in this white car parked over here on 33rd Street. 
14 The person who does the talking seems interested in a 
15 particular SUV, and they start talking price. That person gets 
16 hesitant when you're talking about the price. I would submit 
17 that if the person is going to steal a vehicle, he's not going 
18 to hesitate about the price and say, I want to steal something 
19 cheaper. That's not going to be going through his mind, the 
20 price of this was too much; I'm going to steal a cheaper 
21 vehicle. 
22 So I would submit that is something you can take into 
23 consideration on whether or not the State has proved that the 
24 person who took the car for the test-drive was even the same 
25 person who stole the vehicle. 
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1 And Mr. Salazar doesn't get any identification from 
2 this person, goes in and gets the keys, gives him the keys, 
3 tells him to take it for a drive. No testimony as to what the 
4 person was supposed to do when he came back, whether he was 
5 supposed to talk to Mr. Salazar, where he supposed to park the 
6 car, whatever. We know the entrance to the car lot is on 
7 33rd Street over here where the building is. Mr. Salazar's 
8 office is here; there's a couple of offices here. There are 
9 places around here where he testifies that this car sometime 
10 leaves forty-five minutes to an hour later. 
11 He doesn't see it leave. That's when he first starts 
12 getting concerned, is when he sees that white car is gone, 
13 ^cause he assumes that the people who took the car for a test 
14 drive were riding in that white car. I would submit there's a 
15 lot of things that happened that Mr. Salazar never saw. The 
16 person who took the vehicle for a test drive could have 
17 returned the car, could have left, and someone else could have 
18 stolen the car. It could have been with one of the other two 
19 people that could have arrived in two separate vehicles/ when 
20 the other two people may have taken the car after the person 
21 who took the test drive left. Like I say, if a person is going-
22 to commit a theft of a vehicle, why is he going to be quibbling 
23 about the price and want to steal the cheaper vehicle? 
24 Now, Mr. Saunders gets a chance to get back up here 
25 and make an argument, what's called rebuttal argument. That's 
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1 because the State has the burden of proof. I don't get a 
2 chance to get back up and make another argument after he's 
3 done. He will get up here and tell you why this is not a 
4 reasonable doubt. 
5 But the testimony that comes from Mr. Salazar as to 
6 what happened here, things that happened that he never 
7 observed, and the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
8 that he stole the vehicle. Like I say, even if you believe 
9 Mr. Noall is the person who took the car for a test drive — and 
10 we're not conceding that supposition; he's not — because they 
11 haven't identified him properly. And there's not enough 
12 evidence to identify him; maybe it's a mistaken identity. But 
13 even if you believe he is, the State still has to prove that if 
14 he took the car for a test drive, he's still the person who 
15 stole it. 
16 And I would submit that there's too many holes left 
17 in this case, that the State has failed to present sufficient 
18 evidence for you to go back to the jury room and find him 
19 guilty. Thank you. 
20 MR. SAUNDERS: I want to talk a little bit about this 
21 photo lineup. You'll get a chance to look at it. 
22 May I approach the jury a little closer, your Honor? 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 MR. SAUNDERS: Thank you. 
25 You can look at this. To me it appears that number 1 
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1 has some facial hair on this chin. Number 2 has facial hair. 
2 Number 3 appears to have facial hair. Number 4 appears to have 
3 facial hair. Number 5, I'll leave that to you. I can't tell 
4 if that's a shadow or if that appears to be facial hair on his 
5 face. Number 6 has facial hair. 
6 Go through there and ask yourself, is this photo 
7 lineup by itself suggesting to Mr. Salazar that he pick 
8 Mr. Noall? I would submit that it is not. Again, recall that 
9 the detective didn't just pull his name out of the hat. Okay. 
10 There was some reason to put together a full lineup with his 
11 picture in there. 
12 I want to talk a little bit about — 
13 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. 
14 That's his burden, that there's evidence, that that evidence 
15 was admitted for a limited purpose and not that the defendant 
16 committed the crime. The jury's not — 
17 MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, you instructed them on -
18 MR. GRAVIS: ~ not allowed to consider -
19 THE COURT: Just a minute. Let him finish. 
20 MR. SAUNDERS: You instructed -
21 THE COURT: Just a minute. 
22 MR. GRAVIS: The jury's not allowed to consider it, 
23 and he's not allowed to argue it. I would submit that he's 
24 arguing evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose, 
25 merely to explain what the defendant did, is somehow evidence 
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1 the defendant has committed the crime. It was not admitted for 
2 that purpose, and it's improper to argue that, 
3 MR. SAUNDERS: That's not true, your Honor. We 
4 admitted it for the purpose to show the reason the detective 
5 did what he did. The Court explained to them that instruction 
6 and told them it was admitted for a limited purpose. I'm not 
7 arguing anything other than that. He had a reason to put 
8 together the photo lineup, and he did. He didn't just come up 
9 with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like 
10 Mr. Noall. I think it's relevant for that purpose, to show 
11 that he had information to put it together — 
12 THE COURT: I think you need -
13 MR. SAUNDERS: - and that's all I'm going argue. 
14 THE COURT: I think you need to very limit your 
15 argument to that, though — 
16 MR. SAUNDERS: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: - specifically. 
18 MR. SAUNDERS: That's what my argument was, too, your 
19 Honor. 
20 I want to talk about this theory of Mr. Gravis's a 
21 little. Maybe the person that took it did take it back, and 
22 somehow somebody else stole it. Mr. Salazar testified that he 
23 was there on the lot. He did go inside. There were other 
24 people that came and talked about vehicles. He spoke with 
25 them. Nobody else test-drove. He was there on the lot. He 
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